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ABSTRACT 
New Zealand's Constitution has evolved gradually a
nd retained its "unwritten" 
form. In 2005 the Constitutional Arrangements Com
mittee released its inquiry into the 
constitutional arrangements that outlined the existing
 Constitution and considered the 
process of reform. This paper argues that the repor
t was inadequate in its failure to 
consider substantive proposals for reform. 
A better approach is to consider whether the Constitu
tion needs to be reformed. 
There are arguments that the Constitution is not in ne
ed of change. However, the New 
Zealand Constitution is constantly changing and this o
ccurs in an unsystematic way. The 
nature of the Constitution means that fundamental laws
 are vulnerable to political change. 
The Constitution is vague and the level of civic educati
on is low. This paper submits that 
a written constitution would remedy these problems. T
his Constitution could be adopted 
when New Zealand becomes a republic. 
A written constitution would be some form of higher
 law. It would consolidate 
current constitutional law. In particular the Bill of R
ights and the Treaty of Waitangi 
must be addressed. As a major change a written cons
titution would have to be adopted 
by a referendum. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of con
tents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 15, 070 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
New Zealand's constitutional arrangements are unusual: the 
Constitution is 
termed unwritten as it is found in numerous sources and there is 
not one comprehensive 
constitutional document.' The Constitution has evolved in a pra
gmatic and incremental 
way. Indifference to constitutional arrangements pervades 
New Zealand society. 
Nevertheless, in 2004, the Constitutional Arrangements Commi
ttee was established to 
undertake an inquiry into New Zealand's constitutional arrange
ments.
2 However, this 
Committee reinforced New Zealand's constitutional traditions: i
t was only permitted to 
examine the existing arrangements and suggest processes for refo
rm. The Committee did 
not consider substantive reform proposals and it did not ans
wer the most pressing 
question: does the Constitution need to be reformed? 
While the Constitution functions acceptably, there are serious p
roblems with it. 
Pragmatic incrementalism has lead to a Constitution without a c
ohesive structure. The 
Constitution is vague, and difficult to access and understand
. Moreover, it lacks 
constitutional safeguards as everything in the Constitution is wi
thin the political arena. 
Accordingly, the rights of Maori, and individuals generally, c
an be disregarded with 
relative ease. 
This paper will analyse the Committee's report, examine more ge
nerally the need 
to reform New Zealand's Constitution and, in particular, focus o
n the need for a written 
constitution. Firstly, it will outline the basic structure of the New
 Zealand Constitution, 
in order to better understand the problems facing New Zealand. S
econdly, the paper will 
consider the Committee's report, looking at why it was establis
hed and what its report 
said. Having revealed the inadequacy of the report as an inquiry 
into the Constitution, it 
will be necessary to examine what should be done with the Con
stitution. This requires 
consideration of whether the Constitution should be changed, a
nd what changes could 
1 See Rt Hon Sir Kenneth Keith "On the Constitution of New Zeala
nd: An Introduction to the Foundations 
of the Current Form of Government" in Cabinet Office Cabinet Man
ual (Wellington, 2001). 
2 Constitutional Arrangements Committee Inquiry to Review New
 Zealand 's E.xisting Constitutional 
Arrangements [2005] AJHR l.24A. 
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improve the Constitution. Lastly the paper will p
ropose the content of a written 
constitution for New Zealand, and outline how this cha
nge might be implemented. 
II THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
Before embarking upon analysis of how the New Zea
land Constitution ought to 
be reformed, it is important to note the basic feat
ures of the Constitution and the 
processes by which it has been changed. New 
Zealand's Constitution is called 
"unwritten" as there is not one comprehensive con
stitutional document that is both 
"fundamental law", in the sense that it sets out the ba
sic laws constituting the system of 
government, and "higher law", in that it stands above o
rdinary statutes.
3 
In contrast, the Constitution can be found in a va
riety of sources: imperial 
legislation, New Zealand legislation, the prerogative p
owers of the Queen, the common 
law, customary international law, the Treaty of Waitan
gi (The Treaty), and constitutional 
conventions.
4 The Constitution Act 1986 is the statute that most c
losely resembles a 
written constitution. However, this statute is incom
plete and it is necessary to look 
outside it for a fuller picture of the Constitution. The
 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 (BORA) is another important component of 
the Constitution. Both of these 
enactments have the status of ordinary statutes and are 
not supreme. 
The uncodified nature of the New Zealand Constitutio
n means that there are few 
limitations on constitutional amendment. Indeed, ch
anges can be enacted through a 
variety of ways, for example, legislative change with 
a simple majority of the House of 
Representatives, decisions of the courts, and even, in 
the case of conventions, through a 
change in practice. The only exceptions are the entr
enched provisions in the Electoral 
Act 1993 and the Constitution Act 1986 that require a
 majority of 75 percent or more in 
the House of Representatives or the approval of 
a simple majority in a national 
3 Philip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative law in N
ew Zealand (2ed, Brookers, Wellington, 200 I) 
112. 
4 See Keith, above n I; Joseph, above n 3, 17-31. 
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referendum. 5 The result is a political constitution: "its workings depend on political 
factors and what happens depends largely on the will of the politicians".
6 
The composition of the Constitution creates a flexible system and constitutional 
evolution is characterised by a "piecemeal development in response to incremental 
needs". 7 New Zealand has not had political upheaval that has led to comprehensive 
reform in other jurisdictions, and it can be argued that "the New Zealand constitution 
remains comparatively underdeveloped."
8 The result of this incremental pragmatism is a 
fragmented constitution that is scattered throughout many different sources. 
Furthermore, difficult areas, such as the Treaty, have been neglected and the current 
constitutional situation is unclear. 
There is a widespread lack of understanding of the New Zealand Constitution and 
a reluctance to address constitutional issues. New Zealand can be slow to enact 
constitutional changes. Dame Sian Elias describes New Zealanders as "notoriously 
indifferent throughout our history about our constitutional arrangements."
9 An obvious 
example of this indifference can be seen in the 15 years it took to adopt the Statute of 
Westminster. This reluctance to change the Constitution means, that when constitutional 
issues arise, New Zealanders "are not well equipped to carry on a productive debate on 
this topic." 10
 Sir Geoffrey Palmer describes this as "a great reluctance to engage 
seriously in the debate on constitutional issues because the traditions of pragmatism are 
so powerful."
11 This attitude has pervaded New Zealand's constitutional development 
and had a profound impact on the nature of our constitution. 
5 Electoral Act 1993, s 268; Constitution Act 1986, s 17. 
6 Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer "The Hazards of Making Constitutions: Some Reflections on Com
parative 
Constitutional Law" (2002) 33 VUWLR 631, 638 ["Hazards of Making Constitutions"]. 
7 B V Harris "The Constitutional Future of New Zealand" [2004] NZ Law Rev 269, 272. 
8 Harris, above n 7, 288. 
9 Rt Hon Dame Sian Elias "Transition, Stability and the New Zealand Legal System" (2004) I O OLR 47
5, 
475. 
'
0 Elias "Transition, Stability and the New Zealand Legal System", above n 9, 476. 
11 Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer "The New Zealand Constitution and the Power of the Courts" (2
006) 15 
Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 551, 574-5. 
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III THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE 
A The Terms of Reference 
Despite New Zealand's constitutional indifference, the Constitutional 
Arrangements Committee was established to review the existing constitutional 
arrangements. The terms of reference of the Committee were focused on two areas: 
firstly, outlining the current New Zealand Constitution, and, secondly, considering 
processes for change. The first three terms of reference are dedicated to the "stocktake" 
of the Constitution and direct the Committee to identify and describe New Zealand's 
constitutional development, the key elements of the Constitution, and the sources of the 
Constitution. The final two terms of reference turn to the process requirements: the 
Committee was to look at the process followed by other countries in changing their 
constitutions, and to describe the processes New Zealand should follow in the future. 
These terms of reference, therefore, gave limited scope for consideration of future 
constitutional reform, and did not signify a great departure from the traditional disinterest 
in constitutional reform. The Committee was principally intended to describe the 
existing constitutional situation. The only forward looking terms of reference were about 
the process of changing the Constitution, rather than substantive reform. This inquiry 
was described as a "tentative step" towards reform.
12 
However, upon examination of 
these terms of reference, it appears doubtful whether the inquiry was intended to lead 
anywhere. 
B Why an Inquiry into New Zealand's Constitutional Arrangements? 
In order to undertake a meaningful discussion of the Committee's 
recommendations and the issues ignored by it, it is useful to explore the political 
environment that gave rise to the inquiry. The Cabinet Policy Committee's paper on the 
12 "Dunne Wary of having Treaty in Constitution" ( 15 November 2004) The New Zealand Herald, 
Auckland. 
8 
constitutional inquiry acknowledged the Justice and Electoral Committee's comments 
about the Constitution in its report on the Supreme Court Bill.
13 This report 
recommended an inquiry into New Zealand's Constitution because "[o]f the matters upon 
which submissions' support or opposition hinged, constitutional issues were among the 
most pivotal". 1
4 Wider constitutional issues, however, could not be considered in depth 
in the context of the Supreme Court Bill. There was considerable opposition to the 
creation of the Supreme Court and this was heightened by perceptions that the 
Government had not achieved sufficient consensus for a constitutional change. The 
political uproar surrounding the Supreme Court, therefore, pushed the Government 
towards a reassessment ofNew Zealand's constitutional arrangements. 
Another force that impacted upon the creation of the Committee was Hon Peter 
Dunne who was appointed chair of the Committee. Dunne is "an ardent republican", and 
was particularly keen to have an inquiry into the constitutional arrangements.
15 It seems 
likely that he would have been keen to chair a Committee with greater scope for change 
and with republicanism on the agenda. Notwithstanding the limited scope of the inquiry, 
he indicated an expectation that the Committee might lead to a Commission of Inquiry 
with a broader mandate. 
16 However, this desire was not realised in the Committee's 
report and the Committee indulged in very limited discussion on any substantive reform. 
An additional contributing factor to the creation of the Committee was the 
controversy surrounding the position of Maori and the Treaty. Prior to the Committee's 
creation, a considerable amount of attention was directed towards these issues. Firstly, 
the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v Ngati Apa found that Maori may still possess 
native title in the foreshore and seabed.
17 The decision was much discussed in the media 
and the apparent dissatisfaction of "middle New Zealand" resulted in the Foreshore and 
Seabed Act 2004, which vested ownership of the foreshore and seabed in the Crown.
18 
13 Cabinet Policy Committee "Processes for Discussing Aspects of New Zealand's Constituion" para 4. 
14 Supreme Court Bill 2002, no 16-2 (Select Committee Report) 52. 
15 "An Interview with Peter Dunne" (I April 2005) The New Zealand Herald Auckland. 
16 Hon Peter Dunne (14 December 2004) NZPD 622 18015; "An Interview with Peter Dunne", above n 15. 
17 Attorney-General v Ngati Apa [2003] NZLR 643 (CA). 
18 Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, s 13. 
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This legislation was highly controversial as, according to the Special Rapporteur to the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), "it polarized public opinion and brought to the 
surface a number of underlying racial tensions in the country".
19 
The "Nationhood" speech of Don Brash MP, the leader of the Opposition, which 
he made to the Orewa Rotary Club in early 2004, increased the focus on these issues and 
"capitalized on earlier uncertainties arising from the Court of Appeal's decision in AG v 
Ngati Apa".20 Indeed, it has been suggested that Brash's Orewa speech "provided the 
spark" for the Committee,21 as it intensified the public attention on constitutional and 
Treaty issues. Brash advocated that the Treaty should not be used as "a basis for creating 
greater civil, political or democratic rights for Maori".
22 In contrast, New Zealand should 
be a country with "one rule for all".
23 
In Philip Joseph's opinion "The Ngati Apa decision and the Orewa speech have 
forced a correction in the political marketplace".
24 Other political parties agreed that the 
Committee was created as a diversion to get Labour past the next election.
25 The reality 
is that neither the Constitution, nor the Treaty were put at issue prior to the elections by 
any Party, and it is highly unlikely that the Committee had any impact on Labour's re-
election. The high level of controversy surrounding the Treaty has stalled debate about 
the Treaty and the Constitution, rather than advanced it.
26 
The nature of the inquiry prompted the New Zealand First and National parties to 
refuse to participate in the Committee. National purported to be uncomfortable with 
19 Rudolfo Stavenhagen, Special Rapporteur to the Economic and Social Council "Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People: Mission to 
New Zealand" (13 March 2006) E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3 para 53 . 
20 Philip A Joseph "The Treaty of Waitangi: a Text for the Performance of Nation" [2004] OUCLJ I, 16. 
21 "An Interview with Peter Dunne", above n 15. 
22 Don Brash "Nationhood" (speech to the Orewa Rotary Club, Auckland, 27 January 2004), 13. 
23 Brash, above n 22, 15. 
24 Joseph, "The Treaty of Waitangi: a Text for the Performance of Nation", above n 20, 16. 
25 See "National 'No' to Part in Govt Inquiry" ( 17 November 2004) The New Zealand Herald, Auckland; 
Stephen Franks ( 14 December 2004) NZPD 622, 18021. 
26 See Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer "The Treaty of Waitangi: Where to From Here? Looking Back to Move 
Forward" (Presentation to the Te Papa Treaty of Waitangi Debate Series, Wellington, 2 February 2006) 
para 8. 
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terms of reference that did not explicitly acknowledge that it was a consideration of the 
status of the Treaty.27 The Committee did not realise National's predictions as the Treaty 
was given very little attention. Moreover, although, as the main opposition party, 
National's refusal to participate hampered the effectiveness of the Committee, due to the 
limited scope of the inquiry, it is unlikely the review would have been very different with 
the participation of the Opposition. 
C Parliamentary Sovereignty: A Reason to Limit the Committee? 
The restrictive terms of reference of the inquiry "were reduced to ones of 
clarification and process and did not mandate consideration of substantive reforms."
28 
What was the purpose of creating a Committee that could not deal with the more complex 
and controversial aspects of the Constitution? The Cabinet Policy Committee reasoned 
that it is difficult:
29 
[T]o assess the need for reform in the absence of a good general understanding of the 
New Zealand constitution as it is now, and without a clear idea of the processes which 
might be required if reform were determined to be desirable at some point in the future. 
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty also helps to explain the refusal to give 
the Committee a more meaningful mandate and the general reluctance of 
parliamentarians to seriously consider constitutional reform. Parliamentary sovereignty 
is a complex doctrine and with differing definitions. The basic premise is that 
"Parliament is the supreme lawmaking body".
30 Debate over the doctrine is about "the 
location of the ultimate decision-making authority - the right to the 'final word' - in a 
legal system."31 Parliamentary sovereignty is in opposition to the idea of constitutional 
supremacy. States that have a written and supreme law constitution often allow the 
27 Gerry Brownlee ( 14 December 2004) NZPD 622, 18008. 
28 Philip A Joseph "Constitutional Law" [2006] NZ Law Rev 123, 132. 
29 Cabinet Policy Committee, above n 13, para 3. 
30 Morag McDowell and Duncan Webb "The New Zealand Legal System: Structures, Processes and Legal 
Theory" (2ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 123. 
31 Jeffrey Goldsworthy The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1999) 3. 
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judiciary to review legislation for constitutional compliance and may strike down 
inconsistent legislation. If New Zealand were to seriously consider major constitutional 
reform, it would be difficult to reconcile any changes that create a supreme and written 
constitution with this doctrine. 
Parliamentary sovereignty is clearly supported by MPs and all the parties in 
Parliament "are united in the view that it is the Parliament that should be in charge, not 
the courts."
32 Rt Hon Michael Cullen, has written in support of parliamentary 
sovereignty and declares he does not support the creation of entrenched higher law as 
"that would lead inevitably to a politicisation of the judiciary and to protracted and 
possibly intractable disputes over turf."
33 In New Zealand's legal system the legislature 
and executive are partially merged, thus a loss of parliamentary power results in the 
Government losing power. However, despite the approval of MPs, the doctrine is not 
universally accepted. In recent times a number of judges and academics have questioned 
the extent of the doctrine.
34 This debate shows that the position of the doctrine in the 
Constitution is unclear. 
Connected to the idea of parliamentary sovereignty, is a fear of judicial activism. 
Judges are perceived to assume a law-making role in breach of the doctrine and are 
considered to be " involved in some political and ideological frolic of their own in 
deciding cases".
35 The legislature ' s commitment to parliamentary sovereignty and fear of 
activist judges can be seen in the Supreme Court Act 2003, which confirms "New 
Zealand's continuing commitment to the rule of law and the sovereignty of Parliament."
36 
While this is a clear attempt to confine the ability of judges to make "activist" decisions 
32 Palmer, "The New Zealand Constitution and the Power of the Courts", above n I 1, 575 . 
33 Hon Dr Michael Cullen "Parliament: Supremacy over Fundamental Norms?" (2005) 3 NZJPIL I
. 
34 See for example Sian Elias "Sovereignty in the 2 I 
st Century: Another Spin on the Merry-Go-Round" 
(2003) 14 PLR 148, Philip A Joseph "Parliament, the Courts and the Collaborative Enterprise"
 (2004) 15 
KCLJ 321; Hon E W Thomas "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts" (2000) 31 V
UWLR 5; 
Robin Cooke "A Constitutional Retreat" (2006) 122 LQR 224. Jeffrey Goldsworthy criti
cises these 
approaches to parliamentary sovereignty in "Is Parliament Sovereign? Recent Challenges to the 
Doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty" (2005) 3 NZJPIL 7. 
35 Palmer "The Treaty of Waitangi: Where to From Here? Looking Back to Move Forward", abo
ve n 26, 
Eara 13. 
6 Supreme Court Act 2003, s 3(2). 
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usurping Parliament' s law-making function , it is debatable whether this provision will be 
effective. There is an "an inbuilt tension or even contradiction" between the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law.
37 The provisions are also subject to 
judicial interpretation. 
In the context of New Zealand ' s adherence to the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty it is unsurprising that the Committee was given little scope to recommend 
constitutional change that could have the potential to decrease Parliament' s power, in 
particular, through the creation of a supreme law constitution. This doctrine is, therefore, 
partially responsible for New Zealand's failure to seriously consider its constitutional 
arrangements. Dame Sian Elias is of the opinion that "a fixation with parliamentary 
sovereignty... is impoverishing our constitutional thinking."
38 While it may be 
unsurprising that Parliament does not want to suggest constitutional reform that may 
result in a loss of power, it is disappointing and does not bode well for future 
constitutional change becoming a reality. 
Looking at the limited report it is easy to think that the Government was 
constrained by the "fear of opening a Pandora' s box of hard political issues."
39 The 
Government may have wanted to address the constitutional issues raised by the creation 
of the Supreme Court. However, it was reluctant to allow a report that had the potential 
to significantly impact on its own power and alter the doctrine parliamentary sovereignty. 
The resulting Committee had a limited ability to recommend anything that had much 
import for New Zealand ' s constitutional future. This illustrates the dependency of the 
development of the Constitution on the will of Parliament. 
37 K J Keith "Soverveignty at the beginning of the 21 s
t Century: Fundamental or Outmoded?" (2004) 63 
CLJ 581, 584. 
38 Elias "Sovereignty in the 21 
st Century: Another Spin on the Merry-Go-Round", above n 34, 149. 
39 Tim Watkin "Get it in Writing" (5 August 2006) The listener 26, 30. 
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( 
D The Report's Recommendations: Do they have any Significance? 
It has been established that circumstances surrounding the creation of the 
Committee and its limited terms of reference did not provide the best environment for 
serious analysis of the future of the New Zealand Constitution. Despite this, the report 
did make some observations and recommendations that are important for constitutional 
reform. 
I The "stocktake" of the Constitution 
The Committee's report, firstly, focused on the first term of reference that related 
to New Zealand's constitutional milestones. The Committee compiled a timeline of these 
milestones adopting "a relatively inclusive approach".
40 They did not think it was 
necessary to achieve consensus on events as it "would likely be temporary, and it is 
unlikely to be considered authoritative".
41 The consideration of the New Zealand's 
constitutional milestones Jed the Committee to adopt the term of "pragmatic evolution" to 
characterise the development of the Constitution.
42 
Upon examination of the milestones the Committee recommended that the House 
of Representatives develop the Select Committee system to address potential 
constitutional issues more effectively when they arise. This recommendation derived 
from the Committee's perception that the legislature's habit of fixing constitutional 
problems as they arise might "inadvertently alter some part of the 'big picture"'.
43 The 
recommendation "seems close to an admission that because of the nature of the New 
Zealand Constitution, many MPs cannot distinguish a political issue from a constitutional 
one".44 This recommendation could allow better examination of constitutional issues as 
they arise in Parliament. However, it does nothing to address the underlying problems 
with the Constitution which make it difficult to identify constitutional issues. 
4° Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 1 1. 
41 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 1 1. 
42 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 12. 
43 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 12. 
44 Palmer "The New Zealand Constitution and the Power of the Courts", above n 11, 574. 
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The second term of reference requested an identification of the key elements of 
the constitutional structure. The Committee took this as an opportunity to examine 
topical constitutional issues and determine the importance of them, the urgency and the 
feasibility of dealing with them, and the risk attached to any change.
45 The members 
considered that, although many were important, "few if any of the issues required urgent 
attention".46 Further, often important problems had low feasibility and were high risk.
47 
The most important topical issues were as follows: the relationships between the three 
branches of government, the role of the Treaty, the functions and nature of the head of 
state, the relationship of international bodies to the Constitution, and whether the gradual 
evolution of the Constitution would lead to undesirable changes.
48 The Committee 
emphasised the need for a cautious approach to constitutional change, due to the risk that 
even "discussion of possible constitutional change may itself unsettle the status quo".
49 
Although this section permitted some examination of current constitutional issues 
facing New Zealand, the Committee took a very cautious approach, favouring the 
retention of the current arrangements, lest any consideration of future changes upset New 
Zealand society. The issues identified are difficult questions about New Zealand's 
constitutional future, and it is debatable whether the refusal to consider these issues in 
any depth is beneficial to New Zealand. There were a number of submissions on these 
topics, and, in particular, on the Treaty. The Committee's failure to indulge in any 
significant discussion was a disappointment for the submitters and meant that the 
Committee had a "negative impact".
50 
Lastly, the Committee looked at the sources of the New Zealand Constitution. 
This section was particularly brief as the Committee thought it to be "rather abstract" and 
45 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 16. 
46 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 16. 
47 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 16. 
48 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 16-17. 
49 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 17. 
50 Joseph "Constitutional Law", above n 28, 136. 
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considered its focus was the "practical milestones of our constitutional arrangements" as 
described in the first term of reference.
51 
The significance of the Committee's examination of the current constitutional 
arrangements to the future development of the Constitution is limited. In Professor 
Joseph's view the timeline of constitutional milestones is a "useful commentary that will 
have general educative value".
52 Sir Geoffrey Palmer states that the report "contains 
some useful background papers and analysis" .
53 However, it is disappointing that this is 
the only result of this part of the inquiry. The Committee' s refusal to examine areas for 
reform that were raised in many of the submissions significantly limits the relevance of 
the report to current constitutional issues. 
2 The process of constitutional reform 
The second focus of the report was the process of constitutional change. A 
number of recommendations were made to the Government on this issue. Firstly, the 
Committee looked at processes followed by other jurisdictions as illustrated in a paper 
produced by the Parliamentary Library that examined the processes followed in a number 
of other countries, including Canada, Australia, and Great Britain.
54 The key lessons 
"were the importance of public engagement, and the difficulty of creating sufficient 
public engagement on constitutional issues when a society is relatively settled."
55 
The larger part of this section focused on how the process requirements of other 
countries could be translated into the New Zealand context. Firstly, the Committee 
observed the flexibility of the New Zealand Constitution and considered that "there is 
minimal legal prescription for the way constitutional change occurs" .
56 The report 
51 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 19. 
52 Joseph "Constitutional Law", above n 28, 136. 
53 Palmer "The New Zealand Constitution and the Power of the Courts", above n 11 , 574. 
54 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, Appendix C. 
55 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 19. 
56 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 21 . 
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indicates that this flexibility is an advantage as the "process can be tailored to the actual 
importance of the reform".
57 
The Committee then briefly canvassed the lessons learned from other countries, 
and, in particular, Australia and Canada, highlighting again the difficulty of getting the 
requisite amount of public engagement.
58 The Committee thought that the existence of 
the Treaty distinguishes New Zealand from the other countries and the majority found it 
"difficult to identify constitutional questions that do not touch on the Treaty to a material 
extent". 59 
The Committee then examined the specific requirements of any change, adding 
the proviso that ''New Zealand is not yet at the point of developing a process for 
considering any particular constitutional reform."
60 The Committee was of the opinion 
that each reform requires its own process as "there is no 'one size fits all' solution."
61 
The Committee made several recommendations to the Government on the process for 
change. There should be "generic principles" to guide any constitutional change.
62 
Firstly, "widespread understanding" of the current constitutional arrangements must be 
fostered. Secondly, by majority the Committee believed that accurate, neutral and 
accessible information must be provided with non-partisan mechanisms to facilitate 
discussion. Thirdly, a generous amount of time is needed for the community to think 
about the change. Finally, again by majority, there should be processes for consultation 
with Maori.63 In response to these recommendations the Government agreed to give 
further consideration to these ideas.
64 
57 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 21. 
58 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 22. 
59 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 23. 
60 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 24. 
61 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 24. 
62 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 25. 
63 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 20. 
64 "Government Response to Report of the Constitutional Arrangements Committee on Inquiry to Review 
New Zealand's Existing Constitutional Arrangements" 3 ["Government Response to Report of the 
Constitutional Arrangements Committee"). 
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The need to contemplate the process by which a constitution is changed is 
essential when considering reform and this is acknowledged in this part of the 
Committee's report. It is easy to focus on the contents of any constitutional reform, 
however, "[h]ow the constitution is made, as well as what it says matters."
65 This is 
important to give the constitution legitimacy. In order to have a legitimate constitution it 
is necessary to respect the international human right to participate in amendment of 
constitutions.66 For a constitution to become an integral part of a society the nation's 
population must be "kept fully informed about the process of making it, and take part in 
that process as much as possible".
67 
The need for the participation of the New Zealand population was acknowledged 
by the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: "basic changes to the constitutional 
framework of government should be matters of broad agreement, and should not be 
decided by a Government itself constituted in accordance with that framework".
68 As a 
means to achieve participation referenda "ought to be held on major constitutional 
issues".69 In New Zealand's flexible constitutional environment participation may not 
require a referendum. The abolition of appeals to the Privy Council is an example of a 
constitutional change that took place without a referendum, nevertheless, prior to the 
change there was considerable discussion and consultation.
70 
It is important for New Zealand to consider constitutional reform that has taken 
place in the context of a "settled social and legal order".
71 Examples of this are Canada 
and Australia. Their experience has shown the difficulties of engaging the public to 
65 Vivien Hart "Democratic Constitution Making" (Special Report I 07), United States Institute of Peace 
<www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srl 07.html> (last accessed 22 April 2006). 
66 Human Rights Committee "General Comment No 25: The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting 
Rights and the Rights of Equal Access to Public Service" ( 12 July 1996) CCPR/c/21 /Rev.1 / Add. 7 para 6; 
Marshall v Canada CCPR/C/43/D/205/1986. 
67 Alison Quentin-Baxter "Making Constitutions, from the Perspective of a Constitutional Advisor" (2002) 
33 VUWLR 661,681. 
68 Royal Commission on the Electoral System "Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: 
Towards a Better Democracy" [1986) AJHR H3 176. 
69 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 68, 180. 
70 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand 's Constitution and Government (4
th 
ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2004) 303 [Bridled Power]. 
71 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 22. 
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implement constitutional change. New Zealand must address this in order to successfully 
implement major change to the Constitution. The process adopted may impact on the 
success of the proposed amendment. Countries that have strictly prescribed methods for 
constitutional change, such as, Australia or Canada, have found it difficult to implement 
changes to their constitutions.
72 New Zealand has flexible arrangements and therefore 
does not have to follow any prescribed form. 
The process of change is important, as the public must be involved and the 
methods used may affect the chances of success. However, the Committee considered 
the process in isolation from any particular changes, and accordingly their 
recommendations were confined to "generic principles" .
73 The most pressing 
constitutional questions facing New Zealand are whether it is in fact necessary to change 
the Constitution. Once it has been decided to attempt change, consideration of process 
becomes more relevant. 
3 Understanding of the Constitution 
Having examined the process by which constitutions are changed, the Committee 
made two further recommendations on fostering public understanding of the 
Constitution.
74 The first was for the improvement of civics and citizenship education in 
schools. The second was for the Government to create an independent institute for the 
purpose of enhancing public understanding about the Constitution. 
While the Government agreed that there should be more c1v1cs education in 
schools, they believed that the new curriculum would address this issue.
75 The draft 
72 Peter W Hogg Constitutional law of Canada (2004 Student Edition, Thomson Carswell, Toronto, 2004) 
75; John Warhurst "From Constitutional Convention to Republic Referendum: A Guide to the Processes, 
the Issues and the Participants" (Research Paper 25 1998-1999, Australian Parliamentary Library) 11 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/library> (last accessed 28 September 2006). 
73 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 24-5. 
74 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 5. 
75 "Government Response to Report of the Constitutional Arrangements Committee", above n 64, 3. 
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curriculum, released in 2006, is couched in broad terms without much detail.
76 Within 
Social Sciences there is acknowledgment that students must "develop understandings of 
people's roles and identities as citizens of New Zealand and other societies".
77 This gives 
some hope that there will be increased focus on civics education, however, at this point it 
is too early to say whether it will effectively improve civics education. The Government 
rejected the idea of an independent institute because it did not consider it was "the best 
mechanism for achieving greater public understanding and more informed debate on New 
Zealand's constitutional arrangements". 
78 
The acknowledgement of the lack of understanding of the New Zealand 
Constitution has significance for any future constitutional change. While there are many 
conflicting ideas about constitutional issues in New Zealand, there is consensus on the 
general ignorance of New Zealanders about their constitutional arrangements.
79 This lack 
of knowledge is an impediment to future changes and needs to be addressed. The ability 
to participate in amendment of the Constitution is constrained by this lack of knowledge. 
Without the general populace having a good knowledge of the Constitution, it 
becomes difficult to change. The failure of the Australian referendum on republicanism 
can be, at least in part, attributed to the Australian people's ignorance about their 
constitution.
80 However, the need to understand the constitution of one's nation exists 
independent from proposals to change the constitution. This is because "citizens have 
both the right and an obligation to understand their system of government, whether there 
is an active movement for change or not".
81 
76 Ministry of Education "The New Zealand Curriculum: Draft for Consultation 2006" (Learning
 Media, 
Wellington, 2006). 
77 Ministry of Education, above n 76, 22. 
78 "Government Response to Report of the Constitutional Arrangements Committee", above n 64, 4
. 
79 See for example Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 26; "The Hazards of
 Making 
Constitutions", above n 6, 642. 
8° Constitutional Centenary Foundation Report on a Decade of Experience (Constitutional Centenary 
Foundation, 2000) para 16. 
81 Constitutional Centenary Foundation, above n 80, para 2. 
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Although the nature of the New Zealand Constitution makes it inaccessible to the 
public and difficult to understand,82 the Committee did not examine the idea that reform 
is necessary to achieve widespread understanding of the Constitution. This creates a 
rather difficult situation: on the one hand to reform the Constitution the public must have 
sufficient knowledge to participate in the reform. On the other hand, without substantial 
reform the nature of the Constitution impedes widespread understanding. 
E What the Committee did not Say 
The Committee's report provides an overview of the Constitution and considers 
how New Zealand might proceed to implement reform. However, the report says very 
little about the future of the Constitution and whether it should be reformed. This 
illustrates the conservatism and caution that pervades constitutional discussions in New 
Zealand. The refusal to examine the need to reform the Constitution is understandable 
given the terms of the reference and the political environment surrounding the creation of 
the Committee. Nevertheless, the limited scope of the inquiry almost entirely negated the 
potential significance of its report for New Zealand's constitutional future. This paper 
submits that it would better for New Zealand to address the areas of the concern in the 
Constitution and assess whether there should be reform, rather than ignoring these 
important issues. The following sections of this paper will attempt to answer the 
questions not answered by the Committee and establish a path for the New Zealand 
Constitution to follow into the future. 
IV ARGUMENTS FOR RETAINING THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION 
A "If it Ain't Broke, Don't Fix it" 
Despite apparent problems in the New Zealand constitutional system, there is 
support for retaining the current Constitution and allowing it to continue its pragmatic 
evolution. A common theme is that the Constitution "ain't broke, so don't fix it" and this 
82 "The Hazards of Making Constitutions", above n 6, 642. 
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can be seen at the "Building the Constitution" Conference in 2000. 83 This proposition is 
symptomatic of the attitude of indifference and pragmatism that New Zealanders 
generally exhibit towards the constitutional arrangements. This attitude has favoured the 
pragmatic development of the Constitution in response to the perceived needs of the time, 
rather than principled constitutional reform. 
The idea that the Constitution is not "broken" gained support in the Constitutional 
Arrangements Committee's report. It was of the view that "there is nothing to suggest 
that a constitutional crisis is just around the corner".84 Further, it was a reluctant to 
propose specific changes lest it may " irretrievably unsettle the status quo without any 
widely agreed resolution being achievable." 85 This was supported by submissions to the 
Committee. For example, in his submission to the Committee, Lord Cooke of Thorndon 
stated that "by and large the present New Zealand constitutional arrangements work 
reasonably well",86 and there was no need to reform the Constitution "on the grounds of 
ambiguity, contradiction or frustration. "87 Likewise, Paul Rishworth considered that 
"New Zealand is a respected, stable and functional democracy, with a heightened regard 
for minority interests."88 It may be dangerous to undertake constitutional reform as it 
"may be unsettling and divisive, and ultimately incapable of effective consensual 
resolution if there is no pressing need."89 This constitutional conservatism and reluctance 
to accept change is often evident in New Zealand legal academics' constitutional 
discourse. 
Three arguments were raised to counter this attitude at the "Building the 
Constitution" Conference: that the Constitution may not be broken but it is quaint, that it 
is better to keep the Constitution in order than leave it to break, or, this approach being 
83 Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 10. 84 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 8. 
85 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 8. 
86 Lord Cooke of Thorndon "Submission to the Constitutional Arrangements Committee on the Inquiry to 
Review New Zealand's Existing Constitutional Arrangements", para I 0. 
87 Lord Cooke ofThorndon, above n 86, para I 0. 
88 Paul Rishworth "Submission to the Constitutional Arrangements Committee on the Inquiry to Review 
New Zealand ' s Existing Constitutional Arrangements" . 
89 Rishworth , above n 88. 
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mainly supported by Maori participants, that "it is broken and does need fixing". 90 
Moreover, this argument can be seen as "an argument for mediocrity". 91 The 
Constitution should be the "best we can devise, rather than one that is merely 
serviceable". 92 
In practice the Constitution functions acceptably and this masks many of the 
underlying problems and uncertainties. The approach ignores the fact that, regardless of 
whether it is "broken", the Constitution is in constant state of evolution. This evolution is 
gradual and the Constitution has not developed in a principled or cohesive way that is 
readily accessible and easily understandable. The Treaty is particularly problematic and 
there is a real need to re-examine the Constitution. It is better to acknowledge this 
change and adopt "a systematic approach to future change",93 than to allow the 
Constitution to evolve unchecked. New Zealanders should not let their "if-it-ain't-broke-
don 't-fix-it"94 attitude prevent assessment of the shortcomings of the Constitution and the 
need for reform. 
B Loss of Flexibility 
The New Zealand Constitution has few limits on change and its development has 
been gradual and responsive to perceived needs. The processes by which constitutional 
change happens are extraordinarily flexible. This has its advantages: Matthew Palmer 
considers that the Constitution "is flexible and dynamic and can evolve with changing 
social, economic and cultural circumstances".95 This flexibility is considered a "rare 
luxury".96 
A formalisation of the Constitution would result in a loss of some of this 
flexibility. In particular, a written constitution would set out the methods by which the 
90 James, above n 83. 
91 Bede Harris A New Constitution/or Australia (Cavendish Publishing, London, 2002) 2. 
92 Bede Harris, above n 91, 2. 
93 James, above n 83, 10. 
94 Michael Taggart "The New Zealandness of New Zealand Public Law" (2004) 15 PLR 81, 81. 
95 Matthew Palmer "The Treaty of Waitangi in Legislation" [2001] NZLJ 207,207. 
96 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, Appendix H, 161. 
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Constitution could be amended, for example, a provision requmng referenda on 
amendments. This would make it difficult for the Constitution to continue to evolve in a 
pragmatic and incremental way. 
However, provided the amending procedures are not too rigorous or difficult to 
meet, a formalisation of process may not be a bad thing. Referenda are often cited as a 
necessary precursor to major changes.
97 This is not reflected in New Zealand ' s 
legislation and it could in theory be overlooked. Also, allowing the Constitution to 
continue to meander in an unplanned way could compound New Zealand ' s constitutional 
problems as it does not lead to a cohesive, readily comprehensible constitution. 
Flexibility will be exchanged for certainty in the Constitution: the population and the 
politicians will know what is constitutional law and the methods by which it can be 
changed will be evident. 
C There is not Enough Impetus for Change 
A further argument against reforming the New Zealand Constitution is that there 
is insufficient impetus for large scale constitutional change. Wholesale reform of 
constitutions often takes place within the context of a "cataclysmic event".
98 Successful 
written constitutions are generally "a decisive break with a nation's past".
99 The lack of 
"political trauma" in New Zealand's history is responsible in part for New Zealand ' s 
undeveloped constitution.
100 The piecemeal evolution of the Constitution is evidence that 
"New Zealand's constitutional moment has never arrived ... there has never been a crisis 
or extra-legal behaviour that has required action of the sort that the Americans took in 
1787". 101 Given that New Zealand does not have the levels of political upheaval that 
often lead to new constitutions, is there enough demand for major constitutional reform? 
97 See Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 68, 180. 
98 Joseph, above n 3, 127. 
99 Sir Stephen Sedley "The Constitution in the Twenty-first Century" in Rt Hon Lord Nolan and Sir 
Stephen Sedley The Making and Remaking of the British Constitution (Blackstone Press, London, 1997) 
80. 
100 Joseph, above n 3, 123. 
101 "The Hazards of Making Constitutions", above n 6, 658. 
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It can be argued that currently this demand for change is not evident. For 
example, in his submission to the Committee Rishworth doubted "that there was 
sufficient impetus for major constitutional change such as writing a whole new 
constitution, republicanism, or an entrenched bill of rights". 
102 This argument is related 
to the idea that many do not perceive the New Zealand Constitution as being "broken" 
and in need of major changes. 
The lack of impetus for change renders it difficult to achieve the requisite level of 
support for major change. Discussing the passage of the BORA into law, Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer indicates that "[b ]asic constitutional change really does need widespread political 
support if it is to succeed". 103 It may be difficult enough for New Zealand to engage 
politicians in debate on constitutional issues, let alone to gain the interest and support of 
the New Zealand public. If there is not sufficient interest in the change, major 
constitutional reform cannot occur. 
Although it is true that new constitutional settlements often occur within the 
context of revolution or political upheaval, major changes can and do take place within 
settled societies. For example, Canada implemented major changes to its constitution 
through the Constitution Act 1982, including a domestic procedure for amendment, 104 
and a Charter of Rights. 105 However, the inability to accommodate Quebec and the 
subsequent difficulty in amending the Constitution indicate that this endeavour was not 
entirely successfuI. 106 Thus, it may be more difficult for New Zealand to create the drive 
for change and successfully implement reform with the backing of an engaged 
population. 
New Zealand's constitutional moment may still occur. Constitutional issues such 
as republicanism and unresolved issues surrounding the Treaty may propel New Zealand 
towards reform. The New Zealand Constitution has problems and inadequacies and New 
102 Rishworth, above n 88. 
103 Geoffrey Palmer New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis (John Mcindoe, Dunedin, 1992) 57. 
104 Constitution Act 1982 (Canada Act 1982 (UK), sch 8), ss 38-49. 
105 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of Constitution Act 1982 (CA). 
106 See Hogg, above n 72, 6 7-71. 
25 
Zealand should not wait until public discontent reaches a catastrophic level before 
responding to these. 
V WHY THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE REFORMED 
A The Functions of Constitutions 
The above arguments are based on a fear of disrupting the status quo and causing 
more constitutional problems. However, allowing the constitution to continue to wander 
without following any principled plan, may cause greater problems for New Zealand and 
exacerbate the current inadequacies of the Constitution. A better path to follow is to 
consider how the Constitution ought to be developed. The following parts of this paper 
will examine how the Constitution is inadequate and suggest how it might be improved. 
In order to establish whether the New Zealand Constitution is deficient and ought 
to be reformed, it is necessary to contemplate the functions a constitution should perform. 
The word constitution can be used in a wide sense to mean "the collection of rules which 
establish and regulate or govern the government" , and also in a narrower sense to mean a 
selection of those rules "embodied in one document" . 107 New Zealand only has a 
constitution in the first sense and this is commonly called an "unwritten constitution" . In 
its wider sense a constitution is the "system or body of fundamental principles under 
which a nation is constituted or governed". 108 It regulates the powers of the legislative, 
executive and judicial branches of government and sets "the rules of the political 
game" . 109 
In addition, constitutions have a particular role in regulating the relationship 
between the State and individuals. In this way the constitution creates civil liberties as it 
limits the "exercise of governmental power over individuals" .' 10 A constitution should 
107 KC Wheare Modern Constitutions (Oxford University Press, London, 1969) 1- 2. 
108 "Bridled Power", above n 70, 4. 
109 Alison Quentin-Baxter, above n 67, 669. 
11 0 Hogg, above n 72, I . 
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"control the exercise of governmental power, especially as it affects the rights and 
interests of individual citizens and, in a multi-ethnic society, those of different 
communities". 111 This protective role is particularly important in states, such as New 
Zealand, that contain a number of ethnic minorities whose interests can be overlooked or 
overridden by the majority. 
Written constitutions provide further regulation of the government. A written 
constitution "is thought of as an instrument by which government can be controlled". 112 
Thus, they not only prescribe how governmental power shall be exercised, but they also 
have a higher law status and cannot be amended by the ordinary legislative process. This 
provides greater security and protects a nation's most fundamental laws and is absent 
from New Zealand's constitutional environment. 
A constitution is an important part of a country. The constitution has a "symbolic 
and educative value". 113 The Cabinet Policy Committee paper on the establishment of 
the constitutional inquiry indicated that "[ c ]onstitutional arrangements reflect a nation's 
sense of identity" .114 Constitutions should reflect the values that their country thinks are 
important and have been described as "a mirror reflecting the national soul". 115 What, 
then, does the New Zealand Constitution say about New Zealand's soul? 
B Is New Zealand's Constitution Performing? 
I The vulnerable constitution 
Having considered the role of a constitution, it is relevant to consider whether the 
New Zealand Constitution is effectively performing these functions. A constitution is 
designed to regulate how the government operates and control its exercise of power. 
111 Alison Quentin-Baxter, above n 67, 684. 
112 Wheare, above n I 07, 7. 
113 Constitution for Israel "Why is a Constitution Necessary" <http: //www.cfisrael.org> (last accessed 31 
August 2006). 
114 Cabinet Policy Committee, above n 13, para 5. 
115 Cheffins and Tucker The Constitutional Process in Canada (2nd ed, 1976) quoted in Hogg, above n 72, 
1. 
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New Zealand's Constitution sets out the basic laws of the government, albeit in a number 
of different sources. There is also protection accorded to individuals' rights, in particular, 
through the BORA. 
However, a certain "constitutional vulnerability" 11 6 is apparent in New Zealand's 
constitutional arrangements. The Constitution is ordinary law and nothing in it is out of '(.JS,· 
reach of the ordinary political process. The problem with the political constitution is that 
"[t]here is just not enough form and process laid down - a framework too incomplete 
with insufficient rules - too much is left at large" 11
7 Parliament is convinced it is 
supreme and thus can enact laws "which, no matter how unjust, harsh or even cruel, 
would be beyond the power of any Court to declare invalid".' 
18 While it is unlikely that 
the Government or Parliament will remove fundamental rights, there is still "the 
continual danger - the constant temptation for a zealous Executive - of making small 
erosions of those rights". 119 
Writing in 1980 Professor Quentin-Baxter declared that New Zealand 
Constitution was lacking "constitutional safeguards" when, for example: 
120 
[A] party - or less improbably, a combination of parties - had achieved power without 
disclosing its commitment to radical constitutional change, a bare majority would 
suffice, either to bring Parliament to a standstill, or, after suspending standing orders, 
to push through a short Bill which would give the government plenary delegated 
powers. 
Since 1980, more limits have been placed on the executive and legislative branches of 
government. However, in essence this quotation still rings true. With majority support, 
fundamental constitutional changes can be made. 
116 F M Brookfield "Parliament, the Treaty, and Freedom: Millennial Hopes and Speculations" in Philip A 
Joseph (ed) Essays on the Constitution (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 41, 57. 
117 "The Hazards of Making Constitutions", above n 6, 638 . 
118 Brookfield "Parliament, the Treaty, and Freedom: Millennial Hopes and Speculations" , above n 116, 53. 
11 9 "Bill of Rights for New Zealand: a White Paper" [ 1985] AJHR A.6. 27 ["White Paper"]. 
120 R Q Quentin-Baxter "The Governor-General Constitutional Discretions: An Essay Towards Re-
Definition" ( 1980) I O VU WLR 289, 30 I . 
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The introduction of the mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system has 
limited the dominance of the executive in Parliament. MMP has favoured minority 
governments that are forced to seek support from other parties. Nevertheless, while it 
may be more difficult to obtain majority support, the basic premise is true, that with a 
majority, fundamental constitutional changes can be made. Likewise, the BORA limits 
executive and parliamentary action, for example, legislation must be vetted for BORA 
compliance on its introduction to the House. 121 However, if the House is resolved to 
enact unconstitutional legislation, there is little that the courts can do due to the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty and section 4 of the BORA, which explicitly preserves 
inconsistent legislation. 
Despite the introduction of the BORA and MMP, there is still a "tendency 
towards rapid formulation, introduction and enactment of legislation". 122 For example, 
the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, passed under urgency, appeared to be discriminatory 
under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
according to the CERD Committee. 123 The Government disagreed with the findings and 
despite discrimination being contrary to the domestic and international law, 124 in the face 
of a parliamentary majority the legislation stands. 
A constitution is designed to regulate the state's powers and protect its citizens. 
New Zealand's Constitution does perform this role to a certain degree. However, its 
political nature renders the constitution insecure and vulnerable to change. This restricts 
the Constitution's ability to effectively regulate governmental power. 
121 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 7. 
122 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2005), 8. 
123 Committee on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ( 11 March 2005) CERD, A/60/18, 
para 6. 
124 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 19; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 26. 
2 The Constitution is unclear and vague 
Constitutions are supposed to set out the fundamental law of the state. New 
Zealand's Constitution is problematic in this respect because areas of the "unwritten 
constitution" are unclear. Petra and Andrew Butler consider that "many quite 
fundamental propositions of constitutional law are unsettled".
125 The examples they cite 
are parliamentary sovereignty and the recent controversy over the extent of its 
application, and the status of Treaty. 126 Parliamentary sovereignty has certainly been a 
contentious topic in recent times, with judges, academics, and politicians all questioning 
its meaning and status in the Constitution. 127 The role of the Treaty is also unclear, lying 
somewhere between a fundamental constitutional document and an unincorporated treaty 
that cannot be enforced. This lack of clarity in the Constitution raises doubts as to the 
effectiveness of the Constitution in setting out New Zealand's fundamental laws. 
Parliamentary sovereignty and the Treaty are fundamental elements of the Constitution, 
and if their position in the Constitution is unclear, it is debatable whether the Constitution 
is effectively setting out New Zealand's basic laws. 
3 Can anyone understand the Constitution? 
Although the New Zealand Constitution may function acceptably, it is very 
difficult for many New Zealanders to access and understand. This is because the 
Constitution has developed in an incremental way without any master plan behind its 
development, resulting in a constitution contained in numerous sources. This limits any 
symbolic or educative effect of having a constitution. The Committee bemoans the low 
levels of civic understanding in New Zealand, but produces a document outlining New 
Zealand's constitutional milestones that contains over 50 important events. 128 Matthew 
125 Butler and Butler, above n 122, 8. 
126 Butler and Butler above n 122, 8. 
127 See Cullen, above n 33; Elias "Sovereignty in the 21 st Century: Another Spin on the Merry-go-round", 
above n 34; Joseph "Parliament, the Courts and the Collaborative Enterprise" above n 34; Thomas, above n 
34; Cooke above n 34; Goldsworthy, above n 34. 
128 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n I, appendix B. 
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Palmer has recently identified 80 elements to the Constitution. 129 It seems unreasonable 
and unrealistic to expect the average New Zealander to grapple with these complex 
arrangements. Moreover, if New Zealand keeps its constitutional arrangements 
unchanged, Harris considers that there is a " risk that the existing constitution increasingly 
will not be understood , and will become even more inaccessible" .130 
4 Is the Constitution future proof? 
As a nation New Zealand is undergoing change, and although the informal 
constitutional arrangements may have worked well in the past there is no guarantee that 
they will continue to do so in the future. The New Zealand population is diversifying: 
"[b ]y 2051 , around half of our population are expected to identify themselves as Maori, 
Pacific or Asian New Zealanders". 131 This will alter the culture of New Zealand. While 
the changing demographics of New Zealand may bring benefits, nevertheless " it would 
be foolish to assume that social upheavals in the next 50 years won ' t bend and twist those 
systems and the values that underpin them" .132 Further, basic freedoms are being 
challenged around the world in the face of terrorism threats. New Zealand needs to 
reformulate the Constitution now to meet the changing needs of the nation and to be able 
to proceed into the future with a constitution that can continue to protect the values that 
are important to New Zealand. 
C A Written Constitution: A Remedy for New Zealand's Constitutional Problems? 
As outlined above the New Zealand Constitution fails to impose sufficient 
constraints on the Government, it is unclear in crucial areas, and inaccessible for the 
average New Zealander. These problems can be attributed to the vague and expansive 
unwritten constitution. The United Kingdom and Israel are commonly cited as the only 
129 Matthew S R Palmer "What is New Zealand ' s Constitution and who Interprets it? Constitutional 
Realism and the Importance of Public Office-Holders" (2006) 17 PLR 133, 133. 
130 Harris, above n 7, 282. 
131 Watkin, above n 39, 30. 
132 Watkin, above n 39, 30. 
other states with unwritten constitutions. 133 Unlike New Zealand, the United Kingdom 
has European law above their ordinary statutory enactments acting as a constraint on 
governmental power. For example, prior to the enactment of the Human Rights Act 
1998, the European Convention on Human Rights was applicable to human rights 
infringements. Israel has a Supreme Court that is willing to take an active constitutional 
role, and has elevated the Basic Laws of Israel to a supreme status. 134 Unlike these states 
New Zealand has nothing above the ordinary law. A written constitution would remedy 
this situation. 
Written constitutions are generally both supreme law and fundamental law. 
Constitutional supremacy means that the constitution prevails over inconsistent 
legislation and would be subject to specified processes for amendment. This would 
strengthen the vulnerable constitution and place it above ordinary law. This would 
bestow greater protection to fundamental rights. In a written constitution, human rights 
and Treaty rights, that have been able to be overridden in the past, "are beyond the power 
of Parliament to abridge". 135 
Fundamental law "is the law behind the law". 136 This means that the plethora of 
current constitutional documents (or those of the most significance) would be 
consolidated in one place. Thus, a written constitution could mend the current 
fragmented constitution that is difficult to access, and clarify the uncertainty of the 
Constitution. A written constitution would not only have the function of consolidating 
and clarifying the New Zealand Constitution; it would also reform important areas. In 
particular, reform of areas such as the status of the Treaty, the status of BORA, and the 
balance of power between the branches of government, are issues that would need to be 
considered in adopting a written constitution. 
133 Joseph, above n 3, 13. 
134 Constitution for Israel <http://www.cfisrael.org> (last accessed 31 August 2006). 
135 Brookfield "Parliament, the Treaty, and Freedom: Millennial Hopes and Speculations", above n 116, 54. 
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The recommendations of the Committee to the Government acknowledged the 
New Zealand people's lack of knowledge about their constitution, but did not consider 
the difficulty of accessing and understanding the New Zealand Constitution in its current 
form. It is hard to expect the average New Zealander to examine the many sources of the 
Constitution in order to get a clear picture of it. The existence of a written constitution on 
its own will not necessarily ensure the community has a good understanding of the 
constitution, for example, knowledge of the Australian Constitution is quite low. 137 
However, the creation of a comprehensive constitutional document will make it easier to 
access the Constitution and facilitate a movement towards an improved constitutional 
understanding. New Zealanders will finally be able to "point to a copy of the constitution 
of their country". 138 This can help to ensure that future generations become more 
constitutionally literate. 
The role of a written constitution should not be overstated: no constitution can 
completely guard against revolution or anarchy. But aside from major constitutional 
crises, a written constitution provides better protection to a state's constitutional 
arrangements and more effectively guards individuals from excesses of state power than 
the malleable constitutional structures in New Zealand today. 
D Will New Zealand Have its "Constitutional Moment"? 
As a settled democratic society, with a population that is often indifferent to 
constitutional discourse, it has been questioned whether New Zealand has sufficient 
political unrest to create impetus for major constitutional reform. It is na'ive to think the 
drive for change will never occur; there are unsettled areas of the Constitution in which 
change is predicted. These may provide a catalyst for major constitutional reform. 
The drive for republicanism may push New Zealand towards a new constitution. 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer is of the opinion that New Zealand's constitutional moment is likely 
137 Constitutional Centenary Foundation, above n 80, para 15. 
138 "The Hazards of Making Constitutions", above n 6, 642. 
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to "arrive when it is decided that New Zealand should become a republic". 
139 Such a 
large change would force reconsideration of other constitutional issues and re-
examination of the structure of the Constitution as a whole. In particular, to successfully 
move towards a republic and engender the support of Maori, the status of the Treaty must 
be dealt with. This will open the door to the codification of the New Zealand 
Constitution into supreme Jaw. 
The move towards republicanism is inevitable in New Zealand's future. There 
are already those who consider New Zealand a "de facto republic", 
140 and there are 
predictions that change could happen within the next decade.
141 It seems particularly 
likely the debate will escalate after the death of the current monarch. Nevertheless, to 
abolish the monarchy would be "an extreme and disruptive step for New Zealand".
142 
Currently public demand for the change is not high. In Australia, the move is stronger, 
and if the monarchy is abolished there, New Zealand may follow its lead. 
In addition, the Treaty and the status of Maori are also pressing constitutional 
issues that demand attention and may lead to calls for major constitutional changes. 
Brookfield has indicated his belief that the "the need to find a constitutional solution to 
the Treaty and the inevitable moves towards a republic, will push us towards a wider 
consideration of the kind of Constitution the country should have".
143 The search for a 
resolution of the Treaty's uncertain constitutional status, that is subject to much debate 
and controversy, may push New Zealand towards a resettlement and a new constitutional 
order. 
139 "The Hazards of Making Constitutions", above n 6,659. 
14° FM Brookfield "Republican New Zealand: Legal Aspects and Consequences" [ 1995] NZ Law Rev 310, 
310. 
141 Bridled Power, above n 70, 379. 
142 Lord Cooke ofThorndon, above n 86, para 12. 
143 Brookfield "Parliament, the Treaty, and Freedom: Millennial Hopes and Speculations", above n 116, 57. 
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VI THE CONTENT OF A WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 
A written constitution will enable New Zealand to enter its future confident that 
important constitutional values are secure. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the 
possible content of such a constitution, and to examine the extent to which it will codify 
the existing law, or entail constitutional reform. Throughout the world, there is variation 
in the content and coverage of written constitutions. 144
 New Zealand has had several 
proposals for written constitutions all with differing content. 
145 Bridled Power offers the 
most recent example of a draft written constitution. This constitution "attempts to bring 
together, and add force to those constitutional elements that we have now" .
146 
A What is the Status of a Written Constitution? 
I Supreme Law 
A written constitution would have supreme law status. This is a great departure 
from the current New Zealand arrangements, where Parliament is supreme and no 
legislation is higher law. New Zealand's Parliament strongly supports the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty and guards against '1udicial activism" on the part of the courts. 
This has obscured the significant constitutional issues and prevented discussion on how 
best to strike the balance of power between the legislature and the judiciary. If New 
Zealand adopted a written higher law constitution this would require a reassessment of 
this balance. A supreme constitution "would inevitably imply that Parliament was no 
longer legislatively supreme". 147 The judiciary would be given the power to enforce the 
constitution by striking down inconsistent legislation. This would be particularly 
contentious in respect of the protection of rights under the Bill of Rights. 
144 See Wheare, above n I 07, 32. 
145 See for example the draft constitution of the Constitutional Society for the Promotion of Economic 
Freedom and Justice in New Zealand described in Joesph, above n 3, 117; and D E Paterson 's draft 
constitution for the New Zealand Section of the International Commission of Jurists described in Bridled 
Power, above n 70, 380-1. 
146 Bridled Power, above n 70, 382. 
147 David McGee "Should Parliament be Changed?" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution (Institute 
of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 349, 349. 
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The process that led to the enactment of the BORA reveals New Zealand's past 
reluctance to enact supreme legislation. In 1985, the White Paper on the Bill of Rights 
proposed a supreme law BORA. When this proposal failed, the BORA was enacted as an 
ordinary piece of legislation, by which inconsistent legislation is specifically not 
invalidated. 148 The Justice and Law Reform Select Committee that considered the White 
Paper thought that New Zealand was not "yet ready, if it ever will be, for a fully fledged 
bill of rights". 149 The public were opposed to a supreme law bill of rights because of 
"limited understanding and support for the role of the judiciary under a bill of rights."
150 
Have circumstances changed to the extent that New Zealand would now accept a 
fully enforceable bill of rights as part of a supreme law constitution? New Zealanders are 
more familiar with how such a bill of rights would work, having seen the BORA in 
operation. Also, in the 1980s, the community had "very little knowledge of fundamental 
human rights issues, what human rights are worth specific protection in the New Zealand 
context, and about our constitutional system". 151 Fifteen years with the BORA has made 
the community much more aware of human rights. However, the level of knowledge 
about the Constitution is still low. 
There is criticism of the power a supreme law constitution would give to judges 
and claims that this is undemocratic. Professor John Smillie recently argued in favour of 
the repeal of the BORA, in its current form, because it leaves judges with "virtually 
unconfined discretion". 152 A written constitution would only serve to increase the power 
of the judiciary through their interpretation of the constitution and require judges to 
"make social policy and determine winners and losers in society depending upon the 
meanings those judges choose to give the various provisions in the particular pre-eminent 
148 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act I 990, s 4. 
149 Justice and Law Reform Select Committee "Final Report of the Justice and Law Reform Committee: on 
a White Paper on a Bill of Rights for New Zealand" [1988] AJHR I.SC, 3 ["Final Report of the Justice and 
Law Reform Committee"]. 
150 "Final Report of the Justice and Law Reform Committee", above n 149, 3. 
151 "Final Report of the Justice and Law Reform Committee", above n 149, 3. 
152 John Smillie "Who Wants Juristocracy?" (2006) 11 OLR I 83, 191. 
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written document". 153 Certainly, for supporters of parliamentary supremacy, a supreme 
law constitution is unpalatable. 
Enacting a written constitution does not mandate a choice between a 
parliamentary sovereignty model and constitutional supremacy: countries have also 
"adopted 'hybrid' models, which allocate much greater responsibility for protecting 
rights to courts without altogether abandoning the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty". 154 Hybrid models can be seen in the human rights legislation in Canada 
and the United Kingdom. They increase the judiciary's power to protect rights, currently 
limited by parliamentary sovereignty and section 4 of the BORA in New Zealand, but 
provide some limits. This option may be more acceptable in New Zealand's 
constitutionally conservative environment. 
The United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates declarations of 
inconsistency in section 4. This gives the courts the express mandate to declare that 
legislative provisions are contrary to the Act. Section 10 of the Human Rights Act allows 
a Minister of the Crown to take "remedial action", making the declaration a "springboard 
to accessing a potentially valuable and speedy parliamentary device". 155 This is not 
greatly different to New Zealand, where the Court of Appeal has indicated that, where 
appropriate, they will make declarations of inconsistency, although the BORA does not 
explicitly provide for them. 156 Section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 does not 
guarantee a "tangible remedy". 157 If New Zealand were to enact a written constitution it 
would be preferable to go further than the United Kingdom. 
An alternative and stronger approach is offered in section 33 of the Canadian 
Charter, which allows the legislature to expressly decline to comply with the majority of 
the Charter's provisions. The provision leaves the last word with the legislative body and 
153 James Allan "Why New Zealand Doesn't Need a Written Constitution" ( 1998) 5 Agenda 487, 489. 
154 Jeffrey Goldsworthy "Homogenizing Constitutions" (2003) 23 OJLS 483, 483. 
155 Andrew S Butler "Judicial Review, Human Rights and Democracy" in Grant Huscroft and Paul 
Rishworth Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
Oregon, 2002) 47, 65. 
156 Moonen v Board of Film and literature Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA) para 20 Tipping J for the Court. 
157 Butler, above n 155, 65. 
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shows the extent of the influence of parliamentary sovereignty on the Charter. 158 This 
answers "a good deal of the concern about the legitimacy of judicial review by unelected 
judges".159 Yet it has not greatly detracted from human rights protection. On the face of 
the provision, it gives the legislature considerable power however, in reality, this is 
limited because of the political attention that would be directed towards the use of the 
section. Section 33 has only been used on rare occasions outside Quebec and it seems 
that it will "be used infrequently and only when the legislating government is persuaded 
that there are powerful reasons of public policy to justify its use". 160 
A provision such as section 33 would be a useful addition to a New Zealand 
written constitution: " [g]iving Parliament the final say is consistent with New Zealand ' s 
traditions and making the judgment to invade rights is consistent with New Zealand ' s 
traditions" .161 It allows a compromise between judicial protection of fundamental rights, 
and the continuation, albeit in a limited form, of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. On a practical level this may render it easier to obtain consensus on the 
Constitution. 
A supreme law constitution would be a significant change. It would have the 
advantage of setting out clearly the roles of the legislature and the judiciary, and 
redirecting the dialogue about parliamentary sovereignty to more important areas of the 
Constitution. The best option for New Zealand is a "hybrid" constitution, such as the 
Canadian model, that balances parliamentary sovereignty and constitutional supremacy. 
The Constitution can act as a more effective safeguard, with judges striking down 
inconsistent legislation, while Parliament is acknowledged as the major law-maker, with 
the final say on enacting laws contrary to the Constitution. Currently, in New Zealand 
nothing is protected from political power. Supreme law status places fundamental 
constitutional laws above the ordinary law and protects them from the power of the 
legislature. 
158 Hogg, above n 72, 293. 
159 Hogg, above n 72, 719. 
160 Hogg, above n 72, 845. 
161 Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer "The Bill of Rights Fifteen Years on" (Keynote speech Ministry of Justice 
Symposium: the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, I O February 2006) para 32. 
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2 Entrenched law 
Creating a written constitution raises the question of how the Constitution ought 
to be able to be amended and whether it should be entrenched. Most New Zealand Jaw 
can be changed by the ordinary legislative process. The handful of entrenched provisions 
in New Zealand legislation can be modified by 75 per cent of the House of 
Representatives, or a majority in a national referendum. 162 This was the proposed 
amendment threshold in the White Paper on a Bill of Rights. 163 A new supreme law 
constitution needs to be more difficult to change than ordinary legislation: "[i]t ought not 
to be so immutable that change would be very difficult, but change ought not to be so 
easy that it could be done in a single parliamentary evening with a compliant 
majority". 164 
Some written constitutions m other jurisdictions offer complex amendment 
procedures. 165 Often this requires widespread consensus throughout the different states 
of a country, and thus is not applicable to New Zealand as a unitary state. Others require 
mandatory referenda to effect constitutional changes, for example, the Australian and 
Irish Constitutions. 166 In Canada, there is no legal requirement for referenda but they 
have been used for major changes. 167 
Most major changes would be unacceptable without a referendum. 168 However, 
some changes to the Constitution may not be best suited to a referendum, for example, 
the complex issues surrounding the replacement of the Privy Council. 169 Therefore, the 
best method would be to retain the requirements currently used for entrenched provisions 
162 Electoral Act 1993, s 268. 
163 Draft Bill of Rights, cl 28 in "White Paper", above n I 19. 
164 Bridled Power, above n 70, 382. 
165 See for example section 38 of the Canadian Constitution Act 1982 and section 128 of the Australia 
Constitution. 
166 Australian Constitution, s 128; Irish Constitution, art 46. 
167 For example the Charlottetown Accord, see Hogg, above n 72, 70. 
168 Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 68, 180. 
169 See Harris, above n 7, 284; Supreme Court Bill 2002 16-2 (Select Committee Report) 19-2 I. 
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in New Zealand: a majority in a referendum, or a 75 per cent majority of the House of 
Representatives. This retains a degree of flexibility, yet protects the Constitution from 
amendment without broad consensus. 
B Fundamental Law of the Constitution 
I Incorporation of existing constitutional laws? 
A written constitution would consolidate the fundamental law that constitutes 
New Zealand's governmental system and regulates the different branches of government. 
There are elements of existing constitutional statutes that would be incorporated. The 
predominant constitutional statute is the Constitution Act 1986, which was designed to 
bring together "in one enactment the most important constitutional provisions in existing 
legislation". 170 The enactment sets out the most basic constitutional law relating to the 
Sovereign, the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary, and these would clearly be 
incorporated in a written constitution. However, the Constitution Act is an incomplete 
picture of the Constitution, and it would be important to flesh out and expand upon its 
prov1s1ons. 
Likewise the provisions in the Electoral Act 1993 and the BORA could also be 
provided for in a written constitution. It is not necessary to include every law of 
constitutional relevance in a written constitution. For example, the Official Information 
Act 1982 has constitutional significance, but it is probably unlikely that it would become 
part of the written constitution. A number of imperial acts of constitutional significance 
are in force in New Zealand. 171 These Acts are difficult to access and their archaic 
language renders them difficult to understand. It would be necessary to consider to what 
extent these laws ought to be incorporated into the Constitution. 
2 Should constitutional conventions be codified? 
170 "Constitutional Reform: First and Second Reports Released by the Minister of Justice, the Hon Sir 
Geoffrey Palmer: Reports of an Officials Committee" (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1986) 27. 
171 Imperial Laws Application Act 1988, sch I. 
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Constitutional conventions are another important source of the Constitution. 
Conventions are "recognised customs, norms, or practices that are generally understood 
to be important to government and worth following". 172 These are political practices and 
not legally enforceable. In codifying the Constitution it would be necessary to consider 
whether to include conventions or to leave them in their current form. A written 
constitution does not preclude the continued existence of conventions, for example, 
Canada has a written constitution and constitutional conventions. 173 However, some 
conventions would be better placed within the Constitution. 
There are risks in attempting to codify conventions: "codification would purchase 
certainty at the expense of flexibility and would inhibit constitutional growth". 174 There 
is dubious value in allowing adjudication on conventions. Firstly, conventions are 
political and, "decisions which are essentially political should remain so, and not be 
entrenched in higher law". 175 Secondly, the existence of conventions depends on usage. 
This raises the question of "what purpose legal sanctions would serve so long as 
conventions are regularly observed". 176 
Key functions of the executive are conventional and these provide a good 
example of conventions that could be effectively incorporated into a written constitution. 
The current law does not accurately set out how the executive works and a written 
constitution should attempt to better "reflect the reality of how power is distributed and 
exercised". 177 Despite being "the central decision making body of executive 
government", 178 Cabinet is created by convention. The written constitution could set out 
the role of Cabinet. However, it should confine itself to "the broad composition of 
172 Bridled Power, above 70, 4. 
173 See Hogg, above n 72, 19-28. 
174 Joseph, above n 3, 303. 
175 Mai Chen "Organising the Executive under a Changed Constitution: What Should be Included?" in 
Colin James(ed) Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 289, 295. 
176 Joseph, above n 3, 304. 
177 Chen, above n 175, 295. 
178 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual (Wellington, 2001) para 3.3. 
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Cabinet, its broad powers[ ... ] and the responsibility of Ministers." 179 Too much 
prescription may impinge on Cabinet's flexibility, and allow courts to "scrutinise the 
validity of political decision-making by Cabinet". 180 Although Cabinet could be 
effectively established by a written constitution, the conventions in relation to how 
Cabinet conducts itself should remain non-legal rules. 
In a similar way the office of Prime Minister is created by convention and is not 
mentioned in the Letters Patent 1983 or the Constitution Act 1986. The office of the 
Prime Minister is fundamental to the system of government and could be effectively 
included in a written constitution. 181 Mai Chen suggests only writing down what is 
certain: that there is an office of Prime Minister, the Prime Minister is the Governor-
General's Chief Advisor and the Chair of Cabinet, and that the Prime Minister is 
appointed by the Governor-General. 182 This avoids limiting how the role is performed. 
The conventions that set out important governmental structures and roles should 
be provided for in the written constitution. Care must be taken in considering those 
conventions that outline how the executive and the legislature operate lest their 
codification decrease their flexibility. 
3 Will it change the balance of power between the branches of government? 
Enacting a supreme law constitution would alter the balance of power between the 
judiciary and the legislature, and alter the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. This 
would certainly be a fundamental change to the constitutional system. There is "no 
formal separation of powers under the Westminster Constitution". 183 In adopting a 
written constitution, it could also be considered whether New Zealand wanted to 
formalise the separation of powers and, in particular, create a greater separation of power 
between the executive and the legislature, which are currently partly merged. However, 
179 Chen, above n 175,291. 
18° Chen, above n 175, 293. 
181 Chen, above n 175, 294. 
182 Chen, above n 175, 294. 
183 Joseph, above n 3, 255. 
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it is unlikely that there would be demand for such fundamental changes to the system of 
government. The power of the executive has been limited under the current arrangements 
with MMP and the BORA, and this would be further limited with a written constitution. 
Therefore, the executive's role would remain substantially the same under a written 
constitution. 
4 The powers of the Sovereign 
The content of this written constitution is premised on the idea that it will be 
adopted when New Zealand becomes a republic. It is not within the scope of this paper 
to determine the form that republic should take and this section proceeds on the 
assumption that the future President will perform much the same role as the Governor-
General. It becomes necessary to consider to what extent the role should be entrenched 
in the Constitution. Part 1 of the Constitution Act relates to the Sovereign in New 
Zealand, and the Letters Patent of 1983 constitute the office of the Governor-General. 184 
This law would have to be changed to reflect the changed status of the head of state. It 
would be necessary to include how presidents would be elected or appointed, and how 
the president is expected to perform that role. 
The Governor-General also possesses uncodified reserve powers which allow him 
or her to use personal discretion. There are four reserve powers: the power to appoint a 
Prime Minister, to dismiss a Prime Minister, to refuse to dissolve Parliament, and to force 
a dissolution of Parliament. 185 The extent of these powers is unclear. Assuming these 
continue to be held by the President, it must be decided whether to entrench them in the 
written constitution. Professor Quentin-Baxter suggested that these powers be redefined 
by a resolution of the House of Representatives. 186 Currently these powers are elastic and 
uncertain and it may be difficult to codify them, but the move to a republic coupled with 
the adoption of a written constitution, would necessitate consideration of their role in the 
new constitutional order. 
184 Letters Patent Constituting the Office of the Governor-General of New Zealand 1983 (SR 1983/225). 
185 See Bridled Power, above n 70, 57. 
186 Quentin-Baxter, above n 120,314. 
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C The Bill of Rights 
I The need to incorporate the BORA 
It is the role of a constitution to regulate the power of the state over individuals. 
This is often done via a bill of rights. This section will consider how to transform the 
BORA into a fully enforceable bill of rights. It will also examine whether the content of 
the BORA should be altered or extended before its incorporation into a written 
constitution. The BORA is not fully enforceable as the judiciary cannot strike down 
inconsistent legislation, and such legislation should not be considered to be impliedly 
repealed or revoked. 187 
Despite its weakened form, it is clear that the BORA is recognised as "part of 
New Zealand's constitutional canon". 188 Major constitutional change will have to 
consider the BORA as its future "is inexorably tied to the future of the New Zealand 
Constitution as a whole". 189 The concerns about the extent of executive power that led to 
calls for a bill of rights in 1985 have dissipated due to the "combination of MMP with a 
statutory Bill of Rights". 190 There is probably not sufficient demand for an entrenched 
BORA on its own, however, in the case of adopting a written constitution, "one imagines 
a bill of rights would be part of the package". 191 
The BORA's position as an ordinary statute is problematic and reveals New 
Zealand's constitutional vulnerability. In his submission to the Committee, Lord Cooke 
of Thorndon stated that New Zealand lags behind " international standards and suffers by 
comparison with other developed democracies in the absence of a fully enforceable bill 
187 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 4. 
188 Paul Rishworth and others The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2003) 3 
[The New Zealand Bill of Rights]. 
189 The New Zealand Bill of Rights, above n 188, 23. 
190 Paul Rishworth "Common Law Rights and Navigation Lights: Judicial Review and the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights" (2004) 15 PLR I 03, 118. 
191 Rishworth "Common Law Rights and Navigation Lights: Judicial Review and the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights",aboven 190,119. 
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of human rights." 192 Nevertheless, he was prepared to concede that the "present partially 
enforceable Bill of Rights works tolerably well." 193 Despite not being supreme law, 
generally the Bill of Rights operates effectively and the courts have applied the BORA to 
protect fundamental rights. For example, the Court of Appeal has indicated a willingness 
to make declarations of inconsistency if legislation contradicts the BORA. 194 
Nevertheless, if legislation violates the BORA, the response of the courts is restricted and 
they are unable to give any remedy. 
Adopting a supreme law of bill of rights as part of a written constitution would 
improve this situation. This would require the repeal of section 4 of the BORA and give 
judges the power to strike down inconsistent legislation. As discussed above, there is the 
possibility of restricting the supremacy of the Bill of Rights via a mechanism such as the 
legislative override in section 33 of the Canadian Charter. This could enhance the 
protection of human rights, but leave the ultimate decision on how to balance rights with 
Parliament. 
2 A chance to expand on the rights? 
The metamorphosis of the BORA into a supreme law bill of rights is a 
fundamental change to the Constitution and provides an opportunity to reassess other 
elements of the BORA. Much of the BORA could be transported. For example, the 
BORA would continue to apply only to governmental branches and bodies performing 
public functions .195 Likewise, the limitation provision in section 5 of the BORA which 
allows rights to be subject to "such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" would remain. No right is 
absolute and the test laid out in Moonen has proved to be an effective way of limiting 
192 Lord Cooke of Thorndon, above n 86, para 11. 
193 Lord Cooke ofThorndon , above n 86, para 11. 
194 Moonen, above n 156, para 20 Tipping J for the Court. 
195 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 3. 
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rights. 196 The Canadian experience under section 1 of the Charter shows that this 
provision functions effectively within a supreme constitution. 197 
Some elements of the BORA could be expanded and improved. For example, 
although the courts have interpreted the BORA to permit them to grant remedies when 
appropriate, the BORA does not have an express remedies provision. 198 There is an 
obligation under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to 
remedy breaches of human rights.199 In Canada, section 24(1) of the Charter explicitly 
provides the right to a remedy when rights are infringed. A written constitution ought, 
therefore, to provide remedies where the Constitution is infringed and it should reflect the 
reality of what occurs under the BORA. 
It is also debatable what substantive rights would be part of a written constitution. 
Without a doubt the Constitution would continue to protect the civil and political rights 
currently guaranteed by the BORA. It would also be necessary to consider whether these 
rights ought to be expanded on. Andrew Butler suggests that there are "a number of 
significant rights that have been omitted from the Bill of Rights and to this extent the 
coverage of the Bill of Rights is probably not wholly satisfactory".20° Certain rights in 
the ICCPR, which the BORA is designed to affirm, have been excluded from its ambit, 
for example, the right to privacy,20 1 honour and reputation,202 family rights,203 and the 
rights of children.204 Bills of Rights recently adopted in the Australian states of Victoria 
and the Australian Capital Territory incorporate protection of the family and children.205 
196 Moonen, above n 157, para 18 Tipping J for the Court. 
197 See for example R v Oakes [1986] I SCR 103, 138-139 Dickson CJ . 
198 See for example Simpson v Attorney-General [Baigent 's case} [ 1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA) where the 
Court granted monetary compensation for a breach of the BORA. 
199 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 2(3) . 
200 Butler, above n 155, 52. 
20 1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 17. 
202 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 17. 
203 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts 17 and 23 . 
204 International Covenant on Civil and Political Ri ghts, art 24. 
205 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), s 11 ; Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), s 
17. 
The Victorian Charter also protects privacy and reputation.206 New Zealand could move 
towards incorporating these rights within the new constitution. 
The incorporation of socio-economic rights such as those m the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) is a more contentious 
issue. These rights include the right to work,207 the right to an adequate standard of 
living,208 the right to an adequate standard of physical and mental health,209 and the right 
to education.210 Smillie, who would ideally like to see the BORA repealed, argues that 
the best alternative is extending it to cover economic and social rights.211 This would 
implement New Zealand's international obligations under the ICESCR and is an 
approach that has been adopted in the Constitution of South Africa. 212 In South Africa 
the judiciary are empowered to strike down legislation that is inconsistent with these 
rights and can make policy decisions as to how resources should be distributed.213 
While the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee considered that some social 
and economic rights could successfully be included in an ordinary law bill of rights, 
different considerations are at play when discussing a supreme law bill of rights.214 Sir 
Geoffrey Palmer considers that incorporating socio-economic rights would be "judicial 
encroachment into key government activity". 215 Likewise Andrew and Petra Butler state 
that it is easier to regulate social and economic rights "through specific, and 
particularised legislation rather than through a general statement of economic, social and 
cultural rights". 216 These rights demand budgetary resources to enforce. This requires 
the judiciary to make political decisions on the allocation of resources that Parliament is 
better placed to make. 
206 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), s 13. 
207 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art 6. 
208 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art I I. 
209 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art 12. 
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The protection of fundamental human rights is an important function of a 
constitution. Transferring the BORA to a supreme law constitution requires a 
reassessment of its content. While some provisions in the BORA could be expanded on 
and new rights could be protected, socio-economic rights should not be included in the 
Constitution. 
D The Treaty of Waitangi 
1 The current status 
The Bill of Rights will protect Maori through its anti-discrimination and minority 
protection provisions, however, Maori ought to have special constitutional recognition 
because of the Treaty and their indigenous status. The position of the Treaty and Maori 
rights are highly important to the New Zealand Constitution: "[a]ny revision of New 
Zealand's constitutional arrangements will require the place of the Treaty to be 
settled".217 The Treaty was the most frequently raised issue in the submissions to the 
Committee, and it is disappointing that the Committee did nothing to advance the debate 
on the proper status of the Treaty. 
Before considering how the Treaty could be incorporated into a written 
constitution, it is useful to understand the current constitutional status of the Treaty. New 
Zealand has progressed from the situation where the Treaty is considered a "simple 
nullity".218 However, the standing of the Treaty in the Constitution is still uncertain. On 
the one hand, it is lauded as a fundamental constitutional document and considered "part 
of the fabric of New Zealand society".219 However, on the other, it is still only legally 
enforceable to the extent that it is incorporated into legislation.220 The "principles of the 
217 Palmer "The New Zealand Constitution and the Power of the Courts", above n 11, 568. 
218 Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) 72, 77. 
219 Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 NZLR 188,209 Chilwell J (HC). 
220 Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District Maori land Board [ 1941] NZLR 590 (PC). 
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Treaty of Waitangi" have been protected in a number of pieces of legislation and these 
principles have been given meaning by the courts. 221 
These issues are highly contentious. There is considerable support for the idea of 
one law for all and the removal of special recognition of Treaty rights. This is illustrated 
by the foreshore and seabed controversy and Brash's "Nationhood" speech.222 Also, 
dissatisfaction with the judicial interpretation of the Treaty's principles has lead to calls 
for these legislative references to the "insidious principles" to be removed.223 
In contrast, there is also support for the Treaty's status to be clarified and elevated 
into a supreme law document. This can be seen in Stavenhagen's report to the ECOSOC, 
where he indicated that there is insufficient protection for Treaty rights and "the 
entrenchment of the Treaty of Waitangi in constitutional law is long overdue".224 These 
differing opinions will make it extremely difficult to get broad consensus, which is 
needed for major constitutional changes, not only between Maori and Pakeha, but within 
Maoridom. The Treaty may be the major stumbling block in achieving a written 
constitution for New Zealand. 
2 How to incorporate the Treaty 
There are a number of options for settling the position of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
Firstly, the status quo could be maintained and the Treaty could be kept outside of the 
written constitution.225 Harris considers this option is acceptable provided that it is "a 
deliberate decision of the community".226 However, the current uncertainty regarding the 
Treaty, and the ability of Treaty rights to be overridden, is a major motivating factor for 
221 See New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-Genera/ [ 1987] I NZLR 641 (CA). 
222 Brash, above n 22. 
223 Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Deletion Bill 2006 no 66-1 (explanatory note); See also "National's 
Plan for the Treaty" (April 2005). 
224 Stavenhagen, above n 19, para I 0. 
225 B V Harris "The Treaty of Waitangi and the Constitutional Future of New Zealand" (2005) 2 NZ Law 
Rev 189, 212; See also Justice Edward Durie "The Treaty and the Constitution" in Colin James (ed) 
Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 20 I, 20 I. 
226 Harris "The Treaty of Waitangi and the Constitutional Future of New Zealand", above n 225, 213. 
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such an extensive overhaul of the Constitution. Ignoring the Treaty would do nothing to 
improve New Zealand's constitutional problems. The adoption of a superior law 
constitution without reference to the Treaty could create assumptions that the Treaty was 
constitutionally inferior and weakening its position.227 A written constitution that 
excluded the Treaty would "lack integrity".228 Therefore, the exclusion of any reference 
to the Treaty in the Constitution is not a tenable suggestion. 
Another, more extreme, option posited by Harris is to remove any special 
treatment for Maori in the law.229 This reflects the "one law for all" ideal and the 
objectives of the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Deletion Bill 2006. Instead of 
founding the Constitution on the premise of protecting Treaty rights, the Constitution 
could protect an extreme form of equality through an entrenchment of a "prohibition on 
recognition of different legal interests for Maori".230 This would be a step backwards for 
New Zealand in Maori-Pakeha relations. It does not respect the special indigenous status 
accorded to Maori. 
If the Treaty must be part of the Constitution, it is necessary to consider how it 
can be incorporated. The choices are: incorporation of the text of the Treaty, a reference 
to the principles of the Treaty, or an attempt to enumerate, or even expand, on the 
principles. Direct incorporation of the Treaty's text is a possible course for New Zealand 
to follow. This may render the Treaty vulnerable to amendment. 231 The draft bill of 
rights contained in the White Paper "recognised and affirmed" Maori rights under the 
Treaty of Waitangi and included the Treaty's text in a schedule.232 This was intended to 
"leave the Treaty unimpaired" and not to "re-enact or replace it". 233 
However, direct incorporation of the Treaty raises interpretation problems. The 
English and Maori versions of the Treaty have different meanings. There are clear 
227 White Paper, above n 119, 35. 
228 Durie, above n 225, 20 I. 
229 Harris "The Treaty ofWaitangi and the Constitutional Future of New Zealand", above n 225,213. 
230 Harris "The Treaty of Waitangi and the Constitutional Future of New Zealand", above n 225, 214. 
231 Harris, above n 7, 292. 
232 Draft Bill of Rights, cl 4 in "White Paper", above n 119. 
233 "White Paper", above n 119, 37. 
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problems with incorporating the text of the Treaty, and if this were done "the two 
versions and the difficulties (at least in the Maori version) of reconciling the first two 
articles would still have entailed a search for principles" .234 The White Paper 
acknowledged this and anticipated that the Treaty provision would have the effect of 
making the principles "important rather than a literal dissection of the provisions" .235 
Ambiguities in the Treaty mean that reference to the text of the Treaty will always 
involve an examination of the principles of the Treaty. Would it be better to 
acknowledge this and simply refer to Treaty principles in the Constitution? This has been 
the approach used in numerous pieces of legislation. However, reference to the 
principles is continually criticised, as it leaves the task of definition to the courts, and 
thus purportedly gives too much discretion to the judiciary.236 This is unpopular with 
respect to discrete pieces of legislation; certainly the unpopularity would be magnified if 
the principles were part of a supreme constitution that applied to every law. 
The Treaty itself is difficult to interpret and " [e]laboration and more prec1s1on 
seem desirable". 237 To appease those who disapprove of the judicial interpretation of 
principles, it may be possible to attempt to define the Treaty's principles with the 
possibility of expansion. This would be a difficult task: the Treaty covers a broad 
spectrum of Maori relations with the Crown and the feasibility of achieving agreement on 
an exhaustive definition of the principles is low. This is particularly difficult given that 
the Treaty is a living document. The White Paper recognised this by providing that the 
Treaty must "be regarded as always speaking and shall be applied to circumstances as 
they arise". 238 Justice Edward Durie advocates the recognition of principles "without 
presuming to foreclose on the Treaty itself by presenting those principles or rights as 
complete". 239 
234 F M (Jock) Brookfield Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, l aw and l egitimation (Auckland 
University Press, Auckland, 1999), 152. 
235 "White Paper", above n 119, 77. 
236 See Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Deletion Bill 66-1 (explanatory note) . 
237 Durie, above n 225, 20 I. 
238 Draft Bill of Rights, cl 4(2) in "White Paper", above n 119. 
239 Durie, above n 225, 204. 
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In order to attempt to define the principles of the Treaty, it is necessary to 
establish consultation with Maori as to what the Treaty means today. In 1986 the Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System recommended consultation and discussion with 
Maori "about the definition and protection of the rights of the Maori people".240 This 
could enhance understanding of the Treaty and assist in accommodating the Treaty in the 
Constitution. However, it is doubtful that any principles defined by this discussion could 
be presented as absolute. Harris suggests that the Treaty could be incorporated into the 
constitution with "notes that are intended to assist with the Treaty's interpretation".241 
This would provide greater guidance for the courts as to what the Treaty means and thus 
remove the complaints of those who dislike references to principles. It would still allow 
the Treaty to evolve as living document. 
In order to incorporate the Treaty, it is necessary to take an approach that helps 
people understand what the Treaty means. The text alone or simple references to 
principles are insufficient for this task. An attempt to define the Treaty rights could guide 
those who interpret the Constitution. However, this must not present the rights as 
absolute and preclude the Treaty rights from evolving according to the needs of the time. 
This is a difficult task and it is necessary to undertake extensive consultation with Maori 
to achieve these objectives. 
Another issue related to the incorporation of the Treaty is the concept of 
aboriginal self-government. New Zealand must address what role this should have in the 
Constitution. The right to self-determination is recognised in international law.242 The 
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is particularly significant as it 
specifically recognises the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination.243 A written 
constitution and an examination of the position of the Treaty would provide an 
240 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 68, 112; see also Constitutional Arrangements 
Committee, above n 2, 26. 
241 Harris "The Treaty of Waitangi and the Constitutional Future of New Zealand", above n 225, 212. 
242 Article I (I) of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognise the right of"peoples" to self-determination. 
243 Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art 3. 
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opportunity to address this issue. It is necessary to decide what this concept means for 
Maori and whether this should be recognised within a written constitution. 
3 Should the Treaty be within the Bill of Rights? 
It is important to consider whether the Treaty prov1s1on would be considered 
subject to the limitation provision of the Bill of Rights,244 and whether any legislative 
override provision would apply to the Treaty. In the Canadian Constitution Act 1982, the 
protection of aboriginal rights under section 35 falls outside the Charter. The 
implications of this are that the section is not limited by section 1,245 nor is it subject to 
the legislative override in section 33 of the Charter. Nevertheless, aboriginal rights have 
not been interpreted by the judiciary as absolute, and the Supreme Court has placed limits 
on section 35, similar to those in section 1 of the Charter. 246 In contrast, the White Paper 
intended the Treaty to be subject to the Bill of Rights' limitation provision. 
Although "parts of the Treaty are somewhat absolute",247 for the constitutional 
protection to work effectively the Treaty's rights must be able to be balanced with other 
rights and interests. In a practical sense, Treaty rights cannot be seen as absolute. This 
could easily be implemented by making the Treaty provision subject to the same 
limitation provision as the rest of the Bill of Rights. 248 The Canadian experience has 
shown that such a test is necessary to make the protection workable. The rationale for 
enacting a clause enabling the legislature to override the Bill of Rights is equally 
applicable to Treaty rights. This allows the retention of a modified version of 
parliamentary sovereignty, while giving greater protection to rights. The Treaty 
provisions should be placed as part of the Bill of Rights and subject to the same 
limitations as general human rights. 
244 Currently section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
245 
Section I of the Constitution Act 1982 protects rights "subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed 
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". This is the equivalent of section 
5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
246 
R v Sparrow [ 1990) I SCR I 075, 11 I I -11 I 9, Dickson C J; see also Hogg, above n 72, 633. 
247 Durie, above n 225, 20 I. 
248 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
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It is essential for New Zealand's constitutional future that the issue of the Treaty 
be addressed, despite being a difficult problem to resolve. It will be hard for New 
Zealand to proceed with other reforms, such as becoming a republic or entrenching the 
BORA, without considering this issue. 
E Should Anything Else Be in the New Constitution? 
1 A new Upper House 
In 1950, the Legislative Council, New Zealand's Upper House, was abolished. 
Since then New Zealand has had a unicameral system of government as there is only the 
Lower House, the House of Representatives. The re-establishment of a second house 
could provide more checks and balances on the House of Representatives. The creation 
of an Upper House was proposed as a preferred option to act as a check on executive 
power in submissions on the BORA in the 1980s.249 In the current environment there is 
no pressing need for this reform and it is very unlikely to gain any support from the 
public. As Joseph highlights "[t]he public is in favour of reducing the membership of 
Parliament, not increasing it". 250 
Furthermore, the benefits of having an Upper House are not obvious in the New 
Zealand context. The advantages of an Upper House in federal states are not relevant to 
New Zealand as a unitary state. The Select Committee system performs "much of the 
work of a second chamber".251 And the BORA and MMP act constrain executive power. 
Therefore, this reform is neither essential to improve the New Zealand Constitution, nor 
likely to garner much support. 
249 Justice and Law Reform Select Committee "Interim Report of the Justice and Law Reform Select 
Committee: Inquiry into the White Paper: A Bill of Rights for New Zealand" [ 1986] AJHR 1.8A, 11. 
250 Joseph, above n 3, 132. 
251 Joseph, above n 3, 132. 
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2 Local government 
In enacting a written constitution it would be necessary to consider whether 
provision should be made for local government. The role of local government was raised 
in submissions to the Committee. For example, Local Government New Zealand, while 
remaining "neutral" on the need for a written constitution, stated "that the place of local 
government needs to be properly recognised". 252 Another submission suggested that 
local government be recognised in the Constitution Act 1986.253 
Currently local government is not protected in a constitutional document but 
depends "on the will of the Parliament as expressed from time to time, currently in the 
Local Government Act 2002".254 However, local government performs an important 
constitutional role. Including it in a written constitution would keep it free from changes 
"for the sake of short-term political advantage" and provide "security and stability" to 
allow local government to better fulfil its role. 255 Other jurisdictions have included local 
government in written constitutions, for example, the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa. 256 Local government is having an increasingly important constitutional 
role and it would be appropriate for the written constitution to recognise this and attempt 
to protect that role. 
3 Closer ties with Australia 
Constitutional change could be used to create closer ties with Australia. Harris 
considers that while closer ties with Australia may be important, it is not necessary yet 
for a written constitution "specifically to anticipate the possibility of a political union 
252 Local Government New Zealand "Submission to the Constitutional Arrangements Committee on the 
Inquiry to Review New Zealand's Existing Constitutional Arrangements". 
253 Roger Matthews, Grant Hewison and John Sheppard "Submission to the Constitutional Arrangements 
Committee on the Inquiry to Review New Zealand's Existing Constitutional Arrangements". 
254 Bridled Power, above n 70, 248. 
255 Carol Stigley "Local Government's Growing Importance to the Constitution" in Colin James (ed) 
Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 317, 324. 
256 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, arts 151 - 164. 
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with Australia".257 Justice Kirby of the High Court of Australia has called for New 
Zealand and Australia to unite.258 However, not many New Zealanders "would entertain 
full political union".259 Nevertheless, the possibility of closer economic, or even political 
ties with Australia, should be something that is born in mind in creating a new 
constitution for New Zealand. At this point in time, it is too early to contemplate 
inclusion of such provisions in a written constitution. By the time New Zealand is ready 
for major change, this has potential to be a more viable option. 
VII HOW WOULD A WRITTEN CONSTITUTION BE IMPLEMENTED? 
A Participation 
Once New Zealand starts to consider potential changes to the Constitution it is 
essential to address the implementation of these changes. The process of reform is 
important and can impact on the likely success of the proposals. At this point the 
Committee's process recommendations become more useful, although they are still 
restricted by their general focus. 260 There are few legal constraints on constitutional 
reform and most changes can be effected through the ordinary political process. 
Nevertheless, major change, such as the changes advocated above, would require a high 
level of consultation and broad consensus. With regard to changes that touch on Treaty 
issues, it would be necessary to consult with Maori groups and most major constitutional 
changes will have some impact on the Treaty.26 1 To enable New Zealanders to 
participate in a meaningful way, it is essential that public education about the 
Constitution be enhanced. 
There are various approaches to engage the public and undertake consultation and 
it is not within the scope of this paper to comprehensively examine these options. The 
Committee recommended an independent institute to foster public understanding about 
257 Harris, above n 7, 305. 
258 See Joseph, above n 3, 128. 
259 Joseph, above n 3, 128. 
260 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 24-25. 
26 1 Constitutional Arrangements Committee, above n 2, 23 . 
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the Constitution, and this could be used as a first step towards reform. The process could 
also be started by a Royal Commission on the Constitution. This was successfully used 
to initiate reform of the electoral system.262 Australia established the Constitutional 
Centenary Foundation to encourage "review of the Australian constitutional system".263 
A Constitutional Convention, of which half the members were elected and half were 
appointed, was also held on whether Australia should become a republic. 264 
Another recent and innovative approach to change was seen in British Columbia 
where they instituted a Citizens' Assembly on electoral reform. 265 This involved an 
assembly of 160 randomly selected citizens, representative of the gender, age and 
geographical make-up of British Columbia, who studied and recommended changes to 
the electoral system. This was put to the rest of British Columbia in a referendum, but 
was ultimately unsuccessful. Whatever process is adopted, it is necessary to engage all 
New Zealanders in the discussion, with specific provisions for Maori. 
After consultation, these changes would have to be accepted by a majority of New 
Zealand in a national referendum or in referenda to be implemented. This is essential to 
give these changes legitimacy.266 It is also important to consider whether, for issues 
relating to Maori there should be two referenda: one for Maori and one for non-Maori.267 
This reflects their position as a Treaty partner, however, it may be difficult to get 
widespread acceptance for separate referenda. 
262 Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 68. 
263 Constitutional Centenary Foundation, above n 80, para 16. 
264 See Warhurst, above n 72. 
265 <http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca> (last accessed 28 September 2006). 
266 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 68 180. 
267 See Brookfield Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, law and legitimation, above 234, 175; 
Mason Durie "A Framework for Considering Constitutional Change and the Position of Maori in Aotearoa" 
in Colin James(ed) Building the Constitution {Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 414,423. 
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B Incremental or Wholesale changes? 
Also, it is important to bear in mind that it may be harder to implement 
comprehensive changes to the constitution in a settled society. Other countries show us 
"that comprehensive constitutional change is much more difficult than incremental 
change."268 The Canadian Charlottetown Accord, which attempted to accommodate a 
number of amendment proposals, and was subsequently rejected by the Canadian people, 
clearly illustrates this problem. It may prove unwise for New Zealand to abandon the 
incremental approach to change. 
Harris advocates an approach that is incremental, but also "mindful of a long-term 
strategy for New Zealand's constitutional development". 269 His suggested process would 
deal first with the Treaty, then with the Bill of Rights, and then the abolition of the 
monarchy, finally creating a written constitution incorporating these changes.270 While 
there may be benefits to this gradual approach, New Zealand may only get sufficient 
drive for such change in the context of becoming a republic. Also, it may be difficult to 
consider the above issues in isolation from each other. 
The process used to implement these maJor changes to the Constitution will 
impact on their success. Ultimately, the most important thing is to provide sufficient 
opportunities for New Zealanders to participate in the reform, and to provide specific 
Maori consultation. Such fundamental changes must be endorsed by the people and 
referenda are essential. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
The Constitutional Arrangements Committee's inquiry into New Zealand's 
Constitution was created in a political environment that was reluctant to give serious 
268 Ronald L Watts "Process of Constitutional Restructuring: the Canadian Experience in Comparative 
Context" (Working Paper 1, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, Kingston 1999). 
269 Harris, above n 7, 309. 
270 Harris, above n 7, 309. 
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consideration to the Constitution and unwilling to allow the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty to be reassessed. Accordingly, the report focused on outlining the current 
Constitution, considering processes of reform, and barely skimmed the surface of the 
constitutional issues facing New Zealand. 
This is disappointing because, despite arguments that the constitution "ain't 
broke", the New Zealand Constitution is need of change. The Constitution is political 
and can be amended with ease provided there is a majority in Parliament. This has meant 
that the fundamental laws and rights protected by the Constitution are vulnerable and no 
laws are of a higher status. The vague nature of the Constitution means that its content is 
unclear in some areas. In particular, the position of the Treaty is unclear and vulnerable 
to being overridden by legislative action. Furthermore, civic virtue is incredibly low in 
New Zealand and this in part derives from the complexity of the constitutional 
arrangements. 
A written constitution could consolidate the current constitutional law, thus 
remedying the problems of uncertainty and inaccessibility. This Constitution would be 
supreme law putting the laws that are most fundamental to New Zealand out of reach of 
the ordinary political process. This would be a departure from New Zealand's tradition 
of parliamentary sovereignty. Such a Constitution would have a particularly important 
role in protecting citizens from the State: this would occur through the inclusion of a bill 
of rights and reference to the Treaty. It will not be an easy task to implement such a 
dramatic constitutional change, and it will be necessary to fully involve all New 
Zealanders in the process. Ultimately, however, a written constitution will provide a 
more secure Constitution and that can protect the values important to New Zealanders 
more effectively. 
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